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Accountability Lost and the Problem(s) of
Asymmetry
Gregory M. Gilchrist*
Professor Gilchrist argues that calls for more individual prosecutions in
cases of corporate malfeasance are ultimately misguided. In this Essay,
Gilchrist discusses the asymmetries of information and power within
corporations that make criminal prosecutions of high-level executives
particularly difficult and often inappropriate.
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INTRODUCTION
Whither accountability? Loyola University Chicago recently posed
this question at a symposium marking ten years since the Lehman
collapse and all that followed.1 The answer, both implied and correct, is
yes.
Few people faced any consequences following the crisis, and this lack
of consequences eroded public confidence in the justice system. As Judge
Rakoff famously wrote nearly five years ago, “if . . . the Great Recession
was in material part the product of intentional fraud, the failure to
prosecute those responsible must be judged one of the more egregious
failures of the criminal justice system in many years.”2

* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. JD, Columbia. AB, Stanford. I would
like to thank Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Steve Ramirez, and Shelley Dunck for
hosting the symposium and for including me. I would like to thank Alexandra Harrington and the
editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their outstanding work on this Essay.
1. Program, Loyola’s Annual Institute for Investor Protection Roundtable Conference, Lehman
10 Years Later: Lessons Learned? (Sept. 14, 2018), http://www.ilep.info/pdf/symposia/
2018_LUC_IIP_Program.pdf.
2. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisiswhy-no-executive-prosecutions/.
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Five years later, there have been no further consequences, and none are
likely. Accordingly, “[i]n the popular imagination, the people who caused
the crisis got away with it scot-free, and, as what scientists call a
first-order approximation, that’s about right.”3 The banks were bailed out,
the bankers were not prosecuted,4 and the public suffered years of
austerity and fallout from one of the worst financial crises in history.
The public demand for accountability is strong. It most often takes the
form of demanding that those real people who engage in misconduct on
behalf of corporations be criminally prosecuted. This demand extends
beyond the financial industry to all forms of corporate malfeasance. We
hear the call when something goes seriously wrong, whether it is a
financial crisis with links to financial instruments of practically
alchemical provenance, or the catastrophic harm to the Gulf of Mexico
following the failure of an offshore drilling rig: Jail the bankers, lock up
the executives!
The most formal—and accordingly tempered—iteration of this push is
the Yates Memorandum (Yates Memo), published by then-Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates in 2015.5 The Yates Memo provided
guidance to federal prosecutors and directed particular changes to the
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, all aimed at
generating more prosecutions of individuals in cases of corporate
wrongdoing.6 Specifically, the Yates Memo precluded leniency for
corporations cooperating with the Department of Justice unless the entity
provided all information about individuals involved in the misconduct.7
3. John Lanchester, After the Fall, LONDON REV. BOOKS (July 5, 2018), https://www.lrb.co.uk/
v40/n13/john-lanchester/after-the-fall.
4. To be clear, in the popular imagination, this is the crux of the problem. Most criticism, both
popular and scholarly, has been of the failure to hold individuals working in the financial sector
responsible. After all, these “bankers” introduced unacceptable risks to the economy while
insulating themselves and their firms from the failure. That bankers are most responsible for the
crisis mirrors the conventional wisdom; it’s also probably correct simply as a matter of proximate
cause. As with any crisis of this magnitude and complexity, however, there were other culprits too.
For example, the vast majority of the American public accumulated greater and greater debt on the
now-incredible-but-then-widely-held assumption that real property would always appreciate. This
Essay, following the lead of the Symposium, concentrates on the lack of accountability for those
working in the financial sector.
5. See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S.
Attorneys 2 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates
Memo]. As I discuss further below, the demand for more individual accountability is not a singular
or uniform call. The pure populist demand for blood is quite distinct from the measured call by
Judge Rakoff, former Deputy Attorney General Yates, and others who are carefully trying to
improve the legal system. My contention, however, is that the populist demand empowers measured
efforts like the Yates Memo, and such efforts, in turn, are likely to result in quite different
prosecutions than their drafters might have hoped.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
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Additionally, it directed federal prosecutors to prioritize individual
prosecutions when investigating and resolving corporate crimes.8
Sally Yates’s successor, Rod Rosenstein, has said this policy is under
review, but any changes are unlikely to represent a significant shift away
from prioritizing individual accountability. First, Rosenstein said as
much: “[A]ny changes will reflect our resolve to hold individuals
accountable for corporate wrongdoing.”9 Moreover, the call for
individual prosecutions remains as popular as ever, and it seems
politically unwise to roll back this policy. Finally, the Trump
administration has continued to promulgate new policies and
advisories—in the context of both the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA)10 and the United States Commodity Futures Trading
Commission11—consistent with the Yates Memo’s emphasis on
individual prosecutions.
Accordingly, there is little reason to expect a shift away from public
and official demands for individual liability in cases of corporate
misconduct. Demanding individual accountability in the abstract makes
good sense. Prosecuting corporations is, and always has been,
problematic. Doing so visits the wrongs of an agent on generally innocent
owners. Punishing innocent owners for wrongs committed through
property is not without precedent or reason.12 Indeed, when I teach a
seminar on corporate criminal liability, we always read a terrific maritime
case about piracy on the Atlantic during the summer of 1840. 13 The case
is interesting because the court permits the seizure and forfeiture of the
8. Id. at 4.
9. See Rod J. Rosenstein, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Keynote Address at the NYU Program
on Corporate Compliance & Enforcement (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/upload_documents/Rosenstein%2C%20Rod%20J.%20Keynote%20Address_2017.1
0.6.pdf.
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-47.120; see Rod J. Rosenstein,
Remarks at the 34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34thinternational-conference-foreign (emphasizing the “Department’s commitment to hold individuals
accountable for criminal activity” and further stating, “Effective deterrence of corporate corruption
requires prosecution of culpable individuals. We should not just announce large corporate fines and
celebrate penalizing shareholders.”).
11. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Div. of Enforcement, Enforcement Advisory:
Cooperation Factors in Enforcement Division Sanction Recommendations for Companies,
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/lega
lpleading/enfadvisorycompanies011917.pdf (stating that quality of corporate cooperation should
be assessed in part on whether there was full disclosure of the “identities of individual wrongdoers
within the organization, including culpable senior executives, where applicable”).
12. For an excellent overview of two ancient rationales for such punishments, see Albert W.
Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359
(2009).
13. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844).
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brig involved, notwithstanding the fact that the owners were entirely
innocent and unaware of the piracy.14
Corporate criminal liability functions similarly. Fining a corporation
most directly affects shareholders—not management and not those who
engaged in misconduct.15 Whether viewed through a retributive or
deterrence lens, entity-level liability is at best unsatisfying.16 Moreover,
even accepting the viability of deterring corporate malfeasance through
criminal liability, the mechanism is extremely attenuated. The agency
problem, differing time horizons, and variable risk tolerances make
entity-level punishment an inefficient method of deterring individual
corporate agents.
There are good reasons to punish corporations qua corporations. The
best reason, I believe, is that a system that never holds corporations
criminally accountable sends a harmful message that threatens to
undermine its perceived legitimacy: namely, at the corporate level,
crimes are merely priced.17 But for those who want to actually punish and
deter wrongdoing, it is difficult to improve upon individual
accountability.
The call for more individual criminal prosecutions is therefore
understandable and unlikely to dissipate, either as a matter of public
demand or formal policy. And yet, I believe that it is misguided.
Demanding more criminal prosecutions against individuals in cases of
corporate misconduct will mostly impact relatively low-level offenders.
The engineer, the site manager, the accountant—not the senior executive
or director—bears the brunt of these policies. Yet low-level prosecutions,
even if deserved, accomplish little in terms of changing corporate culture.
Moreover, prosecuting lower-level employees for corporate misconduct
risks aggravating the perceived accountability problem through the
appearance of scapegoating, as senior personnel still evade punishment.
At the Symposium, I offered a host of reasons for why increasing
individual prosecutions will fail to achieve the goals of those calling for
14. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 335, 34548 (2018).
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981). There can be, and
generally is, overlap between these categories because management and employees frequently
number among shareholders; however, if the penalty falls on shareholders, it does so with no regard
for differing degrees of culpability.
16. There is no good theory of desert-based punishment of corporations, and while corporations
are subject to deterrence, that alone cannot justify the imposition of criminal (as opposed to civil)
penalties. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 7 (2012).
17. Id.
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such an increase. I have written on this issue before,18 and the topic
generates controversy.19 In this Essay, I will elaborate on one particular
challenge for individual prosecutions: the asymmetry problem.
There are three forms of asymmetry worth immediate mention in this
context. The most fundamental asymmetry is the knowledge gap between
corporate management and law enforcement. That is, in most—but not
all—scenarios, the insiders (management) know more about the targeted
conduct than the outsiders (law enforcement). This is not unique to
corporate law enforcement; it is generally the case that those involved in
criminal conduct know more about the conduct than those tasked with
policing it.20 The entire enterprise of policing might be understood as an
effort to bridge an epistemic gap between some part of the public and the
government. This Essay necessarily considers this informational
asymmetry between the government and individual corporate actors, but
it is not my primary topic.
Two other forms of asymmetry, internal to the firm, are my focus.
First, management has less information than the entity as a whole.
Second, executives have disproportionate power over the course of most
investigations. The former represents informational asymmetry, and the
latter represents power asymmetry. Each creates problems for individual
accountability. In what follows, I consider each in turn.
I. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
The most fundamental problem for individual prosecutions in cases of
corporate misconduct is that many individuals who may be, in some
sense, “responsible” for the misconduct will not be aware of it. The
corporate hierarchy systematically shields management and senior
personnel from a lot of corporate knowledge. Corporate leaders often lack

18. See generally Gilchrist, supra note 14; Gregory M. Gilchrist, Opacity, Fragility, & Power:
Lessons from the Law Enforcement Response to the Financial Crisis, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 647
(2018) [hereinafter Gilchrist, Opacity, Fragility, & Power].
19. See Rakoff, supra note 2; see also MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE
CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET
(2017).
20. While not unique to big business, it may be particularly pronounced in the financial industry.
See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1499 (1993) (arguing that the
“ephemeral nature of financial truths,” aggravated by disincentives to publish findings and the lack
of personnel movement between industry and regulators resulting from extreme salary differentials,
puts financial regulators at a distinct informational disadvantage); see also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Financial Regulation, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 2015, at 97, 109 (“[I]nformation asymmetry [in the financial industry] can prevent
regulators from fully understanding financial innovations and products.”).
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knowledge, and hence lack a guilty mind, or mens rea.21
Corporations, of course, are not real and do not know anything.
Corporate knowledge refers to the set of knowledge held by all corporate
agents. Corporations act only through agents. 22 Corporate awareness of
those acts is coextensive with the set of agents’ knowledge of those acts.
Because the agents are distributed throughout the corporate structure, so
too is the knowledge.
Accordingly, corporations often mask individual conduct. The
corporate form is an elegant shorthand for something far more complex.
It may be easy to describe a particular corporate action by referencing a
corporate act, such as, “Apple introduced a new iPhone today.” And yet
it may be nearly impossible to describe that same action only by
referencing actions by real, live people. This is not to say it is actually
impossible; indeed, it is necessarily possible. Any corporate action can
only be comprised of acts by real people.23 But, to discuss the matter at
the level of individual actions introduces tremendous complexity and
undermines comprehension or even comprehensibility. 24 Imagine trying
to describe the action of a wave only by referencing actions at the
molecular level. With sufficient time and computing power, there is no
reason this could not be done; but even were it done, something would be
lost. The wave matters. So too with corporations.
Consider a company’s decision to introduce code into a car’s computer
system that will evade environmental testing requirements.25 For the
corporation to do this, at least one employee must write that code.
Assume a single employee wrote the code; it does not follow that she
understands that the code will be triggered by a government test.
Moreover, quite likely the coder does not know the legal standard
measured by the prospective test. To evade that standard, someone, likely
a different person, will need to determine the relevant standard. Someone,
possibly yet different, will need to learn how the test is conducted. Yet
another person may need to figure out what condition correlates with
testing and not with routine driving, so as to trigger the cheating code at
the appropriate time. Someone else may need to instruct the coder what
21. Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of Compliance”,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 695 (“[I]ssues of mens rea are often the most difficult elements in FCPA
and other white-collar crime cases to prove.”).
22. 2 NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE FORMS § 59:61 (2018) (“Corporations
can act only through natural persons such as its directors, employees or other agents.”).
23. Id.
24. See Gilchrist, supra note 16, at 1618.
25. See Jack Ewing, 10 Monkeys and a Beetle: Inside VW’s Campaign for ‘Clean Diesel’, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/world/europe/volkswagen-dieselemissions-monkeys.html.
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code she should write, though notably, maybe not why. Even this
illustration is itself almost surely too simple. Many more people will
likely be involved in generating this single corporate action.
For any corporate action, many people will have some knowledge of
the action or events that led to it. Also, many people will need to act in a
particular manner to contribute to that ultimate action. But, it is also true
that, sometimes, no person will have knowledge of all these links in the
chain. No one person may be aware of all the facts and actions that make
up the corporate act. This is true whether the act is the decision to raise
sales quotas, the decision to hire a particular individual, or the decision
to introduce code to cheat emissions tests.
Preet Bharara captured this phenomenon when he explained that “[a]
particular person may have had only partial knowledge, and contributed
in a chain of actions.”26 He described this “problem in business culture,”
as “siloing,” and pointed out that it could undermine compliance.27 Silos
have traditionally developed in large companies along product lines (e.g.,
food; home care; beauty and personal care), and along functions (e.g.,
human resources; legal; sales; design; manufacturing), and along
geographic locations (e.g., Asia, Latin America, Europe).28 Given the
matrices of product, function, and location, silos can and do overlap;
however, silos effectively limit information transfer to some degree, even
as they create other efficiencies.29
The hierarchical nature of corporations probably requires siloing of
some sort. Consider Kroger. As of February 2018, the company operated
2782 supermarkets and employed approximately 449,000 people.30
Kroger, like any massive corporation, likely has a corporate culture that,
to some degree, influences all operations. However, each
brick-and-mortar store also develops its own culture. Managers, clientele,
26. David Ingram, Corporate ‘Siloing’ an Obstacle to Charging GM Employees: Prosecutor,
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2015, 5:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-settlementindividuals/corporate-siloing-an-obstacle-to-charging-gm-employees-prosecutoridUSKCN0RH31B20150917.
27. Id.
28. See Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on Structuring,
Implementing, and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 627 n.21 (2007).
29. Silos, while probably necessary in any large organization, are generally perceived as
problematic, leading to efforts to “‘flatten silos’ and make it easier for people in different
departments to work together.” Linda L. Hardenstein, Building Better Relationships, LEGAL
MGMT., December 2008/January 2009, at 19, 19. While efforts to limit the silo effect are
understandable from a number of managerial perspectives, the reality of silos within large
organizations persists.
30. See KROGER, NOTICE OF 2018 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 2018 PROXY
STATEMENT AND 2017 ANNUAL REPORT at A-5, http://ir.kroger.com/Cache/1001237179.PDF?O=
PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001237179&iid=4004136.
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employee dedication, windows, break rooms, quality of parking lots,
number of trees—all of these factors and more will contribute to a
particular store’s culture. And all of these vary between stores. Policies
seek to introduce uniformity, but that is an elusive aspiration. Given the
extent and complexity of such a massive operation, it is inconceivable
that senior management would have any particularized understanding of
store-level operations. At Kroger, one would expect silos to exist along
department lines, along brand lines, along regional lines, and between
individual stores.
The more complex the industry, the more pronounced siloing becomes.
An obvious “cure” to siloing is enhancing the exchange and availability
of information, but change and complexity work against that effort. The
financial industry suffers acutely from both challenges. Henry Hu
describes the problem in the context of SEC disclosures:
[I]t can be difficult for even the most well-intentioned of intermediaries
to craft good depictions of reality, especially when the reality is highly
complex. Modern financial innovation has resulted in objective realities
that are far more complex than in the past. For instance, the true
economic characteristics of new, esoteric financial products and of
major banks involved in such innovative products are far different, and
more subtle, than the characteristics of traditional stocks and bonds and
of banks that only took deposits and made loans.31

For large and complex operations, siloing does not represent a design
failure; it represents a consequence of computational limits. There is no
mechanism by which to describe total operations in a way that one person
with limited time and multiple responsibilities can grasp.
Hu introduced this problem in the context of public disclosures by
large banks, and he recognized the possibility that if “a major bank is
indeed ‘too complex to depict’ and pure information-type models are
insufficient,” it raises the question of “whether it is also ‘too complex to
exist.’”32 For the problem of public disclosures, Hu offers a possible
technological solution: replace descriptive disclosures with direct public
access to operational data. He explains:
With advances in computer and Internet technologies, it may sometimes
be possible to allow investors to “see” (download) what is effectively
the real world itself in all its grandeur and detail. Such pure information
can be far richer, clearer, and more granular than information that can
be gleaned from intermediary depictions. Moreover, because of the

31. Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (2012).
32. Id. at 1612.
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disintermediation, the information conveyed is free from the taint of
possible biases or misunderstandings on the part of the intermediary.33

Alas, while open access may offer hope for disclosures, it cannot help
management know more about their firm. Disclosures protect the public
as they decide how to invest their money. Open data allows investors to
analyze risk for themselves, using whatever tools and models they feel
appropriate.
This solution already exists for management, and it does little to
address the siloing problem. A massive industry has sprung up around
various databases for managing personnel, inventories, and every aspect
of a business. Still, colorful graphs and numeric ratings fail to capture the
extent of information available on the ground. Indeed, the very problem
is that the extent of information available on the ground far exceeds
human capacity to comprehend. Just as we cannot imagine a wave solely
by reference to molecules, it is also true that we cannot imagine a month
of operations at Kroger solely by reference to individual people.
Management will always know less than the sum total of information
known to employees down the chain. Information is limited at the top.
Accordingly, where there is wrongdoing within a large organization,
there is always the possibility, and indeed the likelihood, that senior
management was simply unaware of the misconduct. This asymmetry of
information, by itself, probably accounts for the vast majority of
corporate criminal prosecutions with no accompanying individual
prosecutions. The senior personnel that the public wants targeted are, for
lack of a better word, innocent.
Of course, innocence is both a legal concept and a moral one, and part
of the challenge law enforcement officials face when explaining
nonprosecutions is bridging that gap. The public may be correct to
condemn corporate leadership for moral failings. When Tony Hayward
pressed for more risk to achieve more reward, even at the cost of safety,
that surely influenced the decision of on-site engineers to push forward
with drilling on the Deepwater Horizon.34 Hayward’s push arguably
represented a moral failing, but that does not preclude him from being
legally innocent. In large and complex organizations, where criminal
liability generally—and rightly35—requires mens rea, we ought to expect
33. Id. at 1714.
34. Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke & Cate Reavis, BP and the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster of 2010, MIT SLOAN MGMT. 3 (Apr. 3, 2012), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/
CaseDocs/10%20110%20BP%20Deepwater%20Horizon%20Locke.Review.pdf
(Hayward
maintained an “aggressive growth strategy” and “spoke publicly about his desire to transform BP’s
culture to one that was less risk averse.”).
35. See Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 270 (2014)
(“The de facto requirement of blatant culpability—demanding that a defendant be shown to have
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less culpability among senior management if only because senior
management is aware of only a fraction of activity within the corporation.
This informational gap between management and the entirety of
corporate agents is a key problem with the demand for more individual
prosecutions. Viable cases will more often exist against lower-level
employees.36 The corporate structure aggregates most corporate
action—be it making a sales pitch, billing for a medical procedure, hiring
a new employee, or any other of the myriad of ways corporations act
thousands of times every day—well below the level of senior
management.
For any given corporate function, with a few limited exceptions, such
as board reports, public disclosures, or firm-level initiatives, lower-level
employees will have more awareness and responsibility for any particular
actions. Yet, those are the people who may actually have less moral guilt
than legal guilt.
Prosecuting
lower-level
employees
within
a
massive
organization—even where guilt is straightforward as a legal
matter—raises difficult questions of fairness. “Do individuals sufficiently
influence companies as large as KPMG to the extent that distributive
justice is served by holding select midlevel employees accountable for
widespread practices within the institution?”37 This is a real and powerful
question. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, two men were
charged with manslaughter and other crimes.38 The manslaughter charges
were eventually dismissed, but other charges stuck, and any prosecution
inflicts a serious toll on the defendant.39 It is worth asking whether those
had a subjective awareness of real wrongdoing— . . . isn’t a bug in our system but a feature.”).
36. Indeed, pushing too hard for individual prosecutions against high-level personnel in cases
of corporate wrongdoing can simply backfire if the evidence is insufficient. As one firm has noted
of the post-Yates Memo prosecutions in the healthcare industry: “despite the overall high
conviction rate in criminal cases brought, the evidence required to prove criminal intent and get
convictions in cases of corporate wrongdoing is often lacking.” Eoin P. Beirne, Health Care
Enforcement Review and 2017 Outlook: Yates Memo in Action, MINTZ,
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2017-01-health-care-enforcement-review-and2017-outlook-yates-memo (citing “two recent examples of individuals who went to trial in criminal
health care enforcement cases after issuance of the Yates Memo” only to be acquitted on the major
counts).
37. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 333 (2007).
38. See Superseding Indictment for Involuntary Manslaughter, Seaman’s Manslaughter and
Clean Water Act at 9, United States v. Kaluza, No. 12-265, 2013 WL 6490341 (E.D. La. Nov. 14,
2012), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/2520121115143638743323.pdf.
39. One defendant pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense, while the other was acquitted at trial.
See Associated Press, BP Engineer Is Not Guilty in Case from 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/energy-environment/bp-engineeris-not-guilty-in-case-from-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html?_r=0.
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men, working a job where their superiors were pushing them for results,
deserved to be held criminally accountable. It is also worth asking
whether holding those individuals accountable could ever accomplish
anything positive for corporate governance generally. 40
The information asymmetry between senior management and the
entity as a whole simply means that in many—probably most—cases of
corporate criminality, management cannot and should not be prosecuted.
There will be cases in which senior executives ought to be prosecuted.41
This, I believe, is what critics of the status quo, like Judge Rakoff, are
really demanding. They are not asking for more prosecutions of mere
employees behaving badly within a bad culture. They are calling for the
dedication required—both in terms of resources and resolve—to make
the difficult cases against senior executives where appropriate.42
The problem lies in the disconnect between the understandable desire
to promote more such prosecutions and the likely effect of a policy
directing prosecutors to target individuals. To the extent prosecutors are
driven by the prospect of recognition and success, deferred prosecution
agreement or non-prosecution agreement resolutions accompanied by
eye-popping fines and a New York Times headline is a relatively easy
path. Once misconduct is public, corporations have little incentive to do
anything other than conduct a vigorous investigation and cooperate with
the government. In doing so, the corporation funds most of the
investigative legwork, and presents a near complete case to the DOJ.43
The prosecutors involved reap the rewards of having successfully
confronted wrongdoing on a large scale within a powerful organization,
with relatively little work. Contrast this scenario with the effort required
to secure a conviction against a powerful individual within an
40. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1277 (2016) (“[T]he weight of criminal prosecution
falls on individuals who, while culpable, had no control over the corporate policies that led to
criminal activity.”).
41. Critics of the failure to prosecute individuals following the financial crisis frequently point
to Enron for the proposition that power has not always precluded prosecution. As I have written
elsewhere:
Enron, however, is a weak proxy for the aftermath of the financial crisis as it involved
the failure of a single entity predicated on plain financial misstatements. The process of
identifying wrongdoers and allocating blame was far simpler than it could ever have
been for wrongdoing that spanned not only multiple firms, but also many industries and
even the private and public sectors.
Gilchrist, Opacity, Fragility, & Power, supra note 18, at 656 (footnote omitted).
42. See Rakoff, supra note 2 (describing the difficult work required to make these cases and
urging that prosecutors rededicate themselves to doing that work).
43. See id. (describing the process by which corporations under criminal investigation fund and
outsource the investigation which, upon completion, will be neatly presented to the prosecutor).
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organization (regardless of whether that organization is a corporation, a
criminal gang, or a political party). These are hard cases, involving
burdensome investigative techniques—like wire taps—and the drudgery
of building a case piece by piece, starting with low-level prosecutions and
moving up the chain through cooperation agreements.44 Still, after all this
work, there is no guaranteed payoff. The net result may not even be a
“win” from the prosecutor’s perspective, either because the effort fails to
secure sufficient evidence to target senior executives or because the
government might still lose at trial.
Critics of the status quo believe that federal prosecutors have become
more reluctant to try to build these more difficult cases against
individuals. I agree. And, I think the reason is obvious: there is little
incentive to engage in this effort when a massive corporate settlement is
equally lauded, or nearly so.45 Having said that, the problem remains: will
instructing prosecutors to target guilty individuals in cases of corporate
misconduct lead to more fulsome investigations? I am skeptical. Most
simply, as a matter of information asymmetry, guilt will aggregate lower
in the corporate hierarchy. Additionally, we can expect a differential in
reported cases favoring those in which management actually has no
exposure, regardless of how much work prosecutors are willing to put
into building a case; this is the subject of the next section.
II. POWER ASYMMETRY
Formally, the board of directors wields ultimate power and hence
control of internal investigations. Practically, management does. In any
event, some combination of management and the board determines how
a company handles potential criminal conduct. Lower-level employees
have no direct46 input on the corporate response; the power over this issue
44. Id. (“If you are a prosecutor attempting to discover the individuals responsible for an
apparent financial fraud, you go about your business in much the same way you go after mobsters
or drug kingpins: you start at the bottom and, over many months or years, slowly work your way
up.”).
45. The reluctance to prosecute corporations and individuals in a more adversarial manner is
not uniformly distributed throughout the Department of Justice.
[S]ome parts of the Justice Department never stopped prosecuting corporate crime. The
Environment and Natural Resources Division, historically the source of the largest
number of corporate prosecutions, entered only two deferred prosecutions in the
seventeen years between 1993 and 2009; the Antitrust Division, the source of the third
largest amount of corporate prosecutions, entered only three deferred prosecutions
during the same timeframe.
See Uhlmann, supra note 40, at 1238–39 (footnote omitted).
46. They may, however, have indirect means of influencing the response, either by filing a
formal whistleblower complaint or otherwise disclosing the issue to the public. See infra notes
56–58 and accompanying text.
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rests entirely at the top of the hierarchy.
Maximally prioritizing individual prosecutions generates problematic
incentives. The Yates Memo provides that if a corporation is “[t]o be
eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the
Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate
misconduct.”47 Were this enforced literally, one would expect selective
reporting only in those cases that do not implicate management or the
board. “The ‘all or nothing’ approach to cooperation may backfire
because it not only allows the corporation to choose ‘nothing,’ but may
encourage that choice.”48
Corporations cooperate with law enforcement investigating corporate
malfeasance because and to the extent it is in the corporate interest to do
so. At least in theory. Those responsible for directing the corporation’s
response to possible wrongdoing are not only fiduciaries, they are people
with their own, sometimes countervailing, interests. The agency problem
is a powerful factor when it involves asking whether to limit corporate
exposure if doing so increases personal exposure. If the entity is entitled
to leniency only where the entity discloses all individual involvement, in
cases where management or the board have exposure, the very people
deciding whether to seek leniency for the company must do so at their
own (potentially significant) peril.
This conflict is not solely generated by the call for individual
prosecutions or the policy of the Yates Memo. There will always be a
disincentive for management to report corporate malfeasance where
doing so could implicate management. That said, the starkness of choice
presented by the Yates Memo—no leniency absent full disclosure of
individual involvement—potentially exacerbates the conflict. If applied
strictly, it is reasonable to expect less cooperation from corporations in
those cases where the misconduct implicates49 management or the board.
The prospect of selective self-reporting in cases that do not implicate
management or the board highlights the need for alternative methods of
law enforcement where management or the board is involved. The
policing of corporations is overwhelmingly outsourced to the
corporations themselves. Yet leniency for the entity is unlikely to
incentivize management personnel to turn themselves in. Corporate
governance can work to address this problem in various ways, such as
47. See Yates Memo, supra note 5, at 3.
48. Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation As Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines
on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 58 (2015).
49. This could be directly, such as cases where management was involved in the wrongdoing;
it could also be indirectly, such as where management or the board failed in some way to timely or
appropriately detect or address misconduct within the organization.
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appointing a compliance officer who reports directly to the board. The
board has a duty to monitor and faces its own liability for failure to do
so.50 Appointing an officer with responsibility for identifying and, if
necessary, reporting criminal conduct to the board, can mitigate the
problem of conflicted management.
Empowering the board is a key aspect of contemporary corporate
governance. The board of directors suffers from a greater deficit of
information than management, and a concomitant lack of power. Yet, the
board, as ultimately responsible and less plainly conflicted than
management, represents the clearest avenue for directly confronting
corporate misconduct. Empowering the board requires informing the
board.
Nicola Sharpe has suggested that companies empower their boards by
adopting a process-oriented approach (POA). This approach holds:
[D]irectors should employ a decision-making process that has at least
four elements: (1) a forward-looking approach to information and data;
(2) independent information-gathering mechanisms; (3) directors that
play a proactive role in organizational goal setting; and (4) deliberation
techniques such as a system for generating and resolving constructive
conflict.51

The POA thus aims to remedy information and power deficits at the
board level. Specifically, by opening new and relatively unbounded
channels of information to the board of directors, this POA curtails the
problem of too little information. By introducing deliberative
mechanisms such as a “devil’s advocate approach,” 52 the POA further
broadens the information that is likely to be presented to the board.53 By
adopting a forward-looking and proactive role for directors, the POA
addresses the practical limits of the disempowered board.
Such an approach, like having a compliance officer who directly
reports to the board, will not ensure perfect compliance or perfect
enforcement. Nothing will. The POA, however, can contribute to better
50. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
51. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board Power and
Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (2012).
52. Id. at 39.
53. Getting material information to the board presents a continuing challenge. Most efforts to
address this challenge rely in some manner on gatekeepers. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case
for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 162 (2010) (“These gatekeepers should reduce the
problems associated with informational asymmetries by providing independent directors with an
alternate and impartial source of information, thereby ensuring that they are not wholly dependent
on insiders.”); JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 1 (2006) (“[A]ll boards of directors are prisoners of their gatekeepers. No board of
directors—no matter how able and well-intentioned its members—can outperform its professional
advisors.”).
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corporate conduct generally.
More still is likely necessary, however, if law enforcement is to
identify those cases—arguably the most important cases to the public
trust—where management or even the board itself is involved in the
misconduct. For this, traditional law enforcement will be required. It is,
of course, wholly unrealistic and undesirable to expect the FBI or other
law enforcement agencies to infiltrate and surveil day-to-day corporate
life. Most simply, the scale of corporate conduct dwarfs any conceivable
law enforcement effort; moreover, the intrusiveness of any such
surveillance would introduce a police state that would outweigh any
possible benefits of more vigorous law enforcement.
No, the law enforcement solution to the reporting gap lies not in
enhanced surveillance; it lies in expanding the pool of likely reporters. If
management is unlikely to report a predictable range of cases—that is,
those inculpating management—empower alternative reporters. The
“broken windows” approach to street crime functioned by increasing
contact between police and insiders generally, in hopes that the police
could use that contact, by threat if necessary, to gain information about
target crimes.54 It aimed to give the police “eyes on the street.”55 The
whistleblower approach to corporate misconduct is similar in effect—it
gives law enforcement access to inside information. But, it is distinct in
that it requires neither an enhanced police presence nor threats against
potential informants; instead it relies on carrots: protecting reporters from
retaliation and paying them for successful reports.
This is the fundamental theory behind whistleblower protections and
incentives. Knowledge within large, publicly traded corporations is
diffuse and widespread. Just as criminal conspiracies risk exposure by the
unavoidable fact that more people know of the wrongful conduct,
corporate conduct is rarely secret. Someone—often many
someones—within the organization know about any particular conduct.
This is true whether the conduct is lawful, plainly criminal, or somewhere
in between. Strong whistleblower protections and incentives effectively
deputize all corporate agents, increasing the chance that someone will
report misconduct to the relevant authority. 56
54. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the
Problem of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 188 (2016). “The ‘broken windows’
theory formulated by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson suggested that ‘quality-of-life’ policing
could prevent the emergence of hot spots in transitional neighborhoods by encouraging law-abiding
people to act as crime-inhibiting ‘eyes on the street’ and to provide information to the police.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
55. Id.
56. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013,
30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2013).
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Indeed, as the risk of whistleblower disclosure increases,57
management’s calculus about self-reporting changes. As Andrew
Ceresney, then-Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement stated:
The SEC’s whistleblower program has changed the calculus for
companies considering whether to disclose misconduct to us, knowing
that a whistleblower is likely to come forward. Companies that choose
not to self-report are thus taking a huge gamble because if we learn of
the misconduct through other means, including through a
whistleblower, the result will be far worse.58

If management will not report, and we know sometimes they will not,
then help others report. That is what whistleblower laws do, and they
must be maintained if we are to have effective law enforcement in the
corporate sphere.59
Management’s influence over internal investigations is powerful, and
if control over reporting is limited to management, the reports will rarely
expose managerial misconduct. Alternative reporters are thus necessary.
However, even with strong whistleblower protection and incentives, it is
still reasonable to expect more wrongdoing will be reported against
lower-level employees than management. In part, this conclusion merely
restates the conclusion one ought to draw from informational asymmetry:
there will be more knowing misconduct down the hierarchy of the
corporation simply because that is where most knowledge resides.

The whistleblower reports information or makes allegations, sometimes to external
regulators, watchdog groups, or the media, and sometimes internally (though often
outside of the chain of command). From the beginning of the practice we now call
whistleblowing such employees have faced retaliation—the threat of which, along with
other incentives, favored remaining silent. The law, thankfully, has evolved to provide
both protection and positive incentives for whistleblowers.
Id. at 390 (footnotes omitted).
57. Whistleblower actions have generally been on the rise. The SEC reports: in FY 2017, “the
SEC ordered whistleblower awards totaling nearly $50 million to 12 individuals. Since the agency
issued its first award in 2012 through the end of September 2017, the program has awarded
approximately $160 million in whistleblower awards to 46 individuals.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1,
https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf [hereinafter SEC
2017 REPORT]. Additionally, the SEC reports an increase in whistleblower tips from 334 in FY
2011 to 4484 in FY 2017. Id. at 23.
58. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at CBI’s
Pharmaceutical Compliance Congress in Washington, D.C.: FCPA, Disclosure, and Internal
Controls Issues Arising in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch030315ajc.html.
59. The SEC concludes that “the promise of monetary awards to whistleblowers whose
information leads to successful enforcement actions, provisions to safeguard whistleblower
confidentiality, and enhanced anti-retaliation protections” are the key components of a successful
whistleblower program. See SEC 2017 REPORT, supra note 57, at 3.
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CONCLUSION
When there is a great failure, the public demands consequences for
those responsible. With limited information, there will often be confusion
about who is responsible for the failure. Moral responsibility, leadership
responsibility, and cultural responsibility are all important; they are also
all distinct from legal responsibility. This can be lost on an angry public.
Demanding accountability is natural. Prosecuting individuals is
something different; it is not natural, it is highly structured and controlled.
Prosecutors ought to bring cases where they are convinced that they can
prove guilt of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. For the vast majority
of crimes at issue in cases of corporate wrongdoing, that requires proving,
at a minimum, that the defendant was aware of the actions at issue. As a
simple matter of corporate structure, this awareness will often be lacking
for senior personnel.
Such informational asymmetry is thus perhaps the strongest argument
against a formulaic push for individual prosecutions. Power asymmetry
amplifies the problem. To the extent senior personnel can influence
which instances of misconduct come to light, they can be expected to
avoid disclosing the problems for which they have legal exposure.
Whistleblowers and better governance may ameliorate this problem, but
they will not eliminate it.
Both types of in-firm asymmetry suggest that the push for more
individual prosecutions will result largely in prosecutions against bit
players in massive organizations. These prosecutions will hardly satisfy
the public demand for accountability, and they may do affirmative harm.
Even where the real person is actually guilty, there remain open questions
about desert. How should we punish someone for a wrong she committed
while functioning in a culture and structure that influenced her actions?
Indeed, how should we punish her when it becomes clear that she could
never hope to influence the culture and structure that were but-for causes
of her crime?
This is not to suggest that a person ought to be excused by the culture
in which they are operating. My suggestion is more modest. Calling for
more individual prosecutions in cases of corporate crime is
understandable, but we ought to think about what the call is likely to net.
In part because of the asymmetries discussed in this Essay, it is unlikely
to net a significant increase in accountability at the top. It is far more
likely to net increased responsibility for lower-level personnel. And there
are many reasons to question whether that result is actually desirable.

